

## Message Text

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72

ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 RSC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 ISO-00 PRS-01 IO-14

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

UNCLAS STATE 223593

TOSEC 441

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, XF

SUBJECT: NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

REF: STATE 222735 (TOSEC 405)

BONN FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO

1. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE PERTINENT PORTIONS OF ARTICLE  
IN NOVEMBER 19 EDITION OF NEWSWEEK ENTITLED "TO THE BRINK  
AGAIN--AND BACK" WHICH APPEARED ON U.S. NEWSSTANDS MORNING  
NOVEMBER 12.

2. QUOTE: PURSUING A COURSE DESCRIBED BY ONE OBSERVER AS  
THE 'DIPLOMACY OF THE HEADLONG RUSH,' KISSINGER GOT SADAT  
TO AGREE TO A PACKAGE THAT GRANTED MOST OF ISRAEL'S  
DEMANDS--THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR AND A QUICK  
START OF DIRECT PEACE TALKS. IN EXCHANGE, SADAT GOT AN  
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ISRAELI PROMISE TO OPEN AN ACCESS CORRIDOR TO EGYPT'S

TRAPPED THIRD ARMY ON THE EAST BANK OF THE SUEZ--AND, MORE IMPORTANT, KISSINGER'S WORD THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY MANEUVER AN EVENTUAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM MOST OF OCCUPIED SINAI.

3. QUOTE: WITH THE FAST-MOVING KISSINGER WAITING EXPECTANTLY--FIRST IN JORDAN, THEN IN SAUDI ARABIA--FOR PRIME MINISTERGOLDAMEIR'S AGREEMENT TO THE DEAL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE JOSEPH SISCO RUSHED TO TEL AVIV, WHERE HE TWISTED ISRAELI ARMS--AND TWISTED HARD. AFTER EXTRACTING A FEW MODIFICATIONS FROM SISCO, MRS. MEIR GAVE IN. BUT EVEN AS KISSINGER WINGED ON TO HIS NEXT MISSION--PEKING--WITH THE TROUBLESOME MIDDLE EAST BEHIND HIM, ISRAEL ANNOUNCED THAT IT STILL NEEDED SOME 'CLARIFICATIONS.' WHILE THIS HEEL-DRAGGING FORCED A WORRISOME DELAY, MRS. MEIR--AFTER TWO URGENT MEETINGS WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR KENNETH KEATING--FINALLY ORDERED MAJ. GEN. AHARON YARIV TO SIGN THE PACT EARLY THIS WEEK.

4. QUOTE: DESPITE ALL THE APPARENT PLUSES IN THE AGREEMENT FOR ISRAEL, MRS. MEIR'S RESERVATIONS WERE UNDERSTANDABLE. FOR THE PEACE-IS-AT-HAND TONE OF LAST WEEK'S MIDEAST ACCORD RAISED OMINOUS PARALLELS TO THE VIETNAM PEACE PACKAGE THAT WAS FAST UNRAVELING 5,000 MILES AWAY. AS IN THOSE EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS, THE KISSINGER STYLE WAS UNMISTAKABLE--A FRAGILE STRUCTURE OF PEACE COMPOSED OF UNWRITTEN 'UNDERSTANDINGS' AND VAGUELY WORDED AGREEMENTS. AND IF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FAILED TO MAKE GOOD ON HIS PRIVATE PLEDGES TO SADAT, THERE WERE MORE THAN ENOUGH DISGRUNTLED HAWKS IN CAIRO READY TO PROPEL EGYPT BACK INTO FULL-SCALE WAR--AND PERHAPS YET ANOTHER FACEDOWN BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

5. QUOTE: INDEED, AS KISSINGER FLEW TOWARD CAIRO LAST WEEK, SADAT WAS COMING UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM HIS GENERALS AND CLOSE POLITICAL ADVISERS TO RESUME THE WAR. THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC WAS JUST BECOMING AWARE OF THE DIRE PLIGHT OF THE 20,000 MEN OF THE THIRD ARMY, AND THE EGYPTIAN GENERALS WERE CONVINCED THAT THEY COULD EITHER ELIMINATE THE ISRAELI BULGE ON THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL

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OR FAILING THAT, TRIGGER A WIDER WAR THAT MIGHT DRAG SOVIET AND U.S. TROOPS INTO THE COMBAT ZONE. EITHER WAY, THE GENERALS THOUGHT THE RESULT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT--AND THEY WERE PRESSING SADAT TO MAKE A MOVE.

6. QUOTE: IN A TOUGH SESSION IN THE ORNATE SALON OF THE TAHRA PALACE, REPORTED NEWSWEEK'S ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE, KISSINGER AND SADAT WORKED OUT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

THAT WOULD PROVIDE A SUPPLY CORRIDOR TO THE THIRD ARMY.  
BUT BEYOND THIS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED SADAT TO  
GIVE HIM TIME. THE ISRAELIS, HE ARGUED, COULD BE  
PERSUADED AS PART OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT TO WITHDRAW--  
IN NO MORE THAN A YEAR--FROM THE SINAI. WHILE SADAT'S TOP  
ADVISERS REMAINED AT BEST SKEPTICAL THAT A WATERGATE-  
WEAKENED PRESIDENT NIXON COULD REALLY BRING THIS MUCH  
PRESSURE ON JERUSALEM, THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT WAS INCLINED  
--FOR THE MOMENT--TO GIVE KISSINGER HIS CHANCE.

CORRESPONDENT DE BORCHGRAVE REPORTED THAT WHEN ONE TOP  
EGYPTIAN ASKED SISCO WHY THE U.S. SHOULD NOW BE TRUSTED,  
SISCO REPLIED: 'OIL AND OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS, I AM  
CONVINCED THAT CONGRESS, DESPITE THE ISRAELI LOBBY, IS  
NOW BEGINNING TO SEE THE SITUATION MUCH MORE CLEARLY.  
THE MOOD IS CHANGING IN THE U.S. IN FAVOR OF THE ARABS.'  
UNQUOTE.

7. IN DESCRIBING SISCO'S TEL AVIV ARRIVAL, ARTICLE SAID:  
QUOTE: IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL, SISCO DROVE TO THE  
MODEST DUPLEX COTTAGE IN TEL AVIV THAT MRS. MEIR SHARES  
WITH HER SON. WAITING FOR SISCO WITH THE PRIME MINISTER  
WERE DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER  
YIGAL ALLON AND GENERAL YARIV (THE MAN IN CHARGE OF ALL  
ISRAELI CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS). IN HER MEETING THE WEEK  
BEFORE WITH PRESIDENT NIXON, MRS. MEIR HAD INSISTED THAT  
THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR WAS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE.  
IT COULD NOT BE LINKED TO THE RELIEF OF THE TRAPPED  
EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY. ON THIS, SHE WAS UNYIELDING. NOW,  
MRS. MEIR WAS TOLD THAT TO GET ISRAEL'S 450 POW'S BACK,  
SHE WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO A U.N. RELIEF CORRIDOR TO THE  
THIRD ARMY. IT WAS A TOUGH PILL TO SWALLOW, AND WHEN  
SISCO LEFT, MRS. MEIR ASKED ALLON AND YARIV TO REMAIN  
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BEHIND. THE NEXT MORNING, MRS. MEIR PROPOSED SOME  
MODIFICATIONS TO SISCO WHICH HE READILY ACCEPT  
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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRESS COMMENTS, ARMISTICE, MAGAZINES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS  
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